Germany’s attack on France in 1940 is one of the most famous military campaigns among both military historians and the general public. Alistair Horne’s To Lose a Battle presents a detailed examination of the campaign itself, while continually contextualizing it within the framework of France’s conflicts with Germany over the previous generations. This approach provides valuable insight, and Horne’s writing style lends the book an exciting dramatic flair. However, though the book is exciting and interesting, in the end it proves to be quite one-sided, presenting the French as bumbling incompetents, perhaps unfairly.First, it must be noted that Horne’s work is a popular history, not a scholarly one. This works both for and against the book. Horne has leeway to describe events in vivid detail with evocative language, often including anecdotes to set the mood. For example, when describing the Panzer attacks on the Meuse, Horne describes how the soldiers “found more barricades manned by dead Frenchmen and a deathly silence broken only by the crackling of flames. In the middle of a street a horse with crazy eyes stood unmoving; as Stackelberg [a war diarist travelling with the troops] approached it, it suddenly collapsed and died.” Horne’s description also lends immense historical weight to the events of the campaign, describing it as “the crisis for France, for Western civilization… it would come to be regarded as one of the critical moments of the twentieth century. At such a moment, suddenly the great, complex stratagems of both sides, in which armies are moved about like chess pieces, become reduced to the isolated actions of one or two men.” Such vivid language is certainly entertaining to the popular audience. However, because of this target audience, Horne omits noting his sources. His footnotes are limited to tangential factual information or entertaining sidebars rather than noting his sources. Horne does include a lengthy bibliography, and while he does make use of war diaries and some archival sources, he also consults an extensive amount of secondary sources. The lack of specific citations in the body of the text makes it difficult to see how much weight he gives to various sources. However, these omissions seem to be a result of tailoring the work for a popular audience rather than inferior scholarship.Horne goes to great lengths to contextualize the battle in the greater narrative of French/German conflict. He sees the 1940 campaign as the last in a series of struggles between the two powers. He also spends a good deal of time on the political developments in France during the interwar period, depicting French politics as a mess of competing bureaucrats that refuse to see the imminent danger facing them. In describing Daladier’s complaints, Horne notes that “It was typical of how self-interest continued to prevail in a France perched on the very brink of disaster. The nation at large was all too discouragingly aware of the ‘swamp of personal jealousies and ministerial appetites’ in Paris… ‘People see a schemer and a thief in every politician… look what a Government we have!” This attitude is probably unfair. There is a case to be made that France and the allies should have been more aware of the danger Hitler’s Germany presented, but this is much clearer in hindsight, and was likely not nearly as clear to those involved at the time.Horne also chronicles the technological developments of both sides during the interwar period, continually pointing out France’s inadequacy. While Horne does demonstrate that “in overall tank numbers, the French and British jointly were actually superior,” he describes that the quality of allied armor was deficient. Citing inferior guns and impaired mobility due to the lack of radios, Horne claims that “weightier than any technical advantage, however, was the superiority of German Panzer crew in training and doctrine.” Horne further notes that “It was of course in the air that the most blatant inferiority of the Allies lay.” He includes a chart showing the numbers of available aircraft, showing that in some areas, the allies “could only count on a total of 746 aircraft. Against this, Goering would be able to deploy 3,000-3,500 planes out of a grand total of 5,000… In mobility and training, the Luftwaffe… also had an incalculable advantage.”6 Again, while these figures present a strong case that France was unprepared for the struggle that lay before them, such claims are easier to make in hindsight. The French were preparing for a defensive stance in a way that made sense based on historical precedents, guarding the Belgian border and the south, where the Maginot line was employed. Horne sees this as foolish, describing the French deployment as “a powerful right flank on the Maginot line… and a powerful left flank facing northern Belgium. But the center, along a front of little less than one hundred miles behind the so-called ‘impenetrable’ Belgian Ardennes, was help by only some four light cavalry divisions… and ten mediocre infantry divisions… And behind them, emptiness.” He condemns such a deployment, commenting “What a standing temptation the spectacle of this French line, then, so weak in the center, might present to an opposing captain of audacity and genius!” Certainly, flaws can be found in France’s defenses, and in particular the lack of reserve forces in key areas. However, Horne’s criticisms are often unfairly based on hindsight, presenting an overly negative view of the French.Horne describes the action itself in vivid detail, giving much credit to Rommel and Guderian for their bold risk taking. While there are a few accounts of French bravery, the reader is often overwhelmed with the depiction of French forces as incompetent or unwilling to offer resistance. Having established that “Gamelin’s Army no longer possessed the offensive capacity of Foch’s of twenty years previously, let alone the will of Joffre’s of the Marne,” Horne presents numerous examples of French ineffectiveness, noting that “offensive actions… by French formations, disorganized as they now were, amounted to almost nil,” and describes French camps as filled with “signs of utter panic,” and the forces there as “already demoralized.” However, Horne contrasts the confident success of the Panzer generals with the nervous apprehension of German command. “The hard-pressed Allied leaders would have been amazed, and encouraged, could they but have seen the nervousness, apprehension and confusion which by 17 May prevailed at the summit of the enemy camp – in sharp contrast to its very tangible success.” This attempt to bust the myth of German confidence is quite refreshing, revealing Hitler and his leadership team to be as nervous and worried as the allies.Horne also addresses the myth surrounding the “fifth column,” the use of German spies to subvert France from the inside. He notes that “No less powerful a ‘secret weapon’ in Hitler’s armoury was the much-vaunted ‘Fifth Column’ – or the belief in its sinister ubiquity. ‘Spy-mania’ had gripped France during the darkest moments of defeat in both 1870 and 1914, but never more devastatingly than in 1940.” While such beliefs, as well as German propaganda campaigns had an undoubtedly significant impact on French morale, Horne demonstrates that such beliefs were unfounded. “Only a fraction of these specific allegations of Fifth Column activities has ever been substantiated. None of the works written analytically in the aftermath of the war sustain the legend.” He claims this “bogey of the Fifth Column became magnified out of all proportion” because of “Goebbels’s propaganda coupled with the boasts of Hitler himself,” finally concluding by quoting Eddy Bauer, saying, “in France there never was a Fifth Column.” Horne does well in tackling such myths, but in doing so further undermines the French disposition.Horne concludes by showing the French loss to not be the fault of a single person or group, but rather, “Two doctrines and two philosophies and the past events of a generation were involved.” He claims that “the road to disaster was clearly signposted,” and that “Since… 1919, almost every throw of the dice had resulted in advantage to Germany and loss to France,” and that “When all is said and done, the strategic brilliance of the German plan and tactical skill with which it was executed will always make it one of the classic campaigns of history.” These analyses are made much clearer through Horne’s lens of hindsight, and present an unfair, perhaps one-sided picture of France prior to World War Two. However, as long as this anti-French bias is taken into consideration, Horne’s work presents a very readable, entertaining overview of the 1940 campaign which can also provide a springboard for further, deeper scholarly research. To Lose a Battle is fitting for its target audience, and offers students and scholars a “big-picture” look at the French-German conflict with a valuable bibliography for further research.
This is a sad book, about the German invasion of France in 1940 and the ensuing debacle of the French and British attempts to throw them back. Basically, the Germans had adapted their strategy to modern technology and the French and Brits had not, so the German tanks and planes literally drove circles around the French army.The outcome, of course, expanded Nazi power and deepend the Holocaust and gave the Germans the ability to invade Russia in 1941, which led to another 40 million deaths.A theme that runs through this book quietly, but always there, is the pointlessness and horror of war. The war was, in a large part, about redeeming German pride after the defeat and humiliations suffered by the Germans in WWI and its aftermath. So, hundreds of thousands died, and millions more in Russia, because of pride. Hitler and the NAZI's were able to tap into this and excecute their aggressive, pathological foreign policy and we all know how that ended.
Do You like book To Lose A Battle: France 1940 (2007)?
Alistair Horne depicts the Fall of France in 1940 in the third and final volume of his history of France and Germany between 1860 and 1940.To understand how World War Two was fought, why the fall of France was such a shock and so surprising, you must begin here. Horne explains how the German sweep was possible, and how the Allied disaster was possible.If you wish to understand the second major campaign of the Second World War, Horne give the reader a detailed look at how it unfolded. I highly recommend it.
—Tyler Lees
This is a superior narrative history of the fall of France in 1940. Horne examines the political and social changes in France following the end of WW I, and how these affected the French military and their ability to resist the German invasion in 1940. Horne examines the diplomatic and political attempts to resist, in addition to the ineffective military response by the French army and air force. Horne utilized an amazing number of sources and his narrative reads as a novel. I was completely absorbed by this book, and what I found particularly interesting was his examination of all aspects of the Maginot Line. I highly recommend this book, as well as his other work, The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916.
—Al
