Good to get a critical perspective on foreign aid and international charity work. I wasn't expecting the heavy focus/historical background on Somalia, but understand how that served as an illustration of the author's point. I certainly learned a lot!Notes and quotes from the book:Personal Notes:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_...PVO = private voluntary organizationNGO = non-governmental organizationA non-governmental organization (NGO) is a legally constituted organization created by natural or legal persons that operates independently from any government and a term usually used by governments to refer to entities that have no government status. In the cases in which NGOs are funded totally or partially by governments, the NGO maintains its non-governmental status by excluding government representatives from membership in the organization.tThe starving African exists as a point in space from which we measure our own wealth, success, and prosperity, a darkness against which we can view our own cultural triumphs. And he serves as a handy object of our charity. He is evidence that we have been blessed, and we have an obligation to spread that blessing. The belief that we can help is an affirmation of our own worth in the grand scheme of things. The starving African transcends the dull reality of whether or not anyone is actually starving in Africa. Starvation clearly delineates us from them. tSometimes it appears that the only time Africans are portrayed with dignity is when they’re helpless and brave at the same time. A person about to starve to death develops a stoic strength. Journalists write about the quiet dignity of the hopelessly dying. If the Africans were merely hungry and poor, begging or conning coins on the streets of Nairobi or Addis Ababa, we might have become annoyed and brush them aside—and most aid workers have done that at one time. When they steal tape decks from our Land Cruisers we feel anger and disgust. It is on ly in their weakness, when their death is inevitable, that we are touched. And it is their helplessness that they become a marketable commodity. (page 3)tWhen I slowed down for a moment to consider what was happening, it became clear: Aid distribution is just another big, private business that relies on government contracts. Groups like CRS are paid by the U.S. government to give away surplus food produced by subsidized U.S. farmers. The more food CRS gave away, the more money they received from the government to administer the handouts. Since the securing of grant money is the primary goal, aid organizations rarely meet a development project they don’t like. (page 8)t… It becomes increasingly difficult for aid workers to ignore the compelling correlation between massive international food aid and increasing vulnerability to famine. “Our charity does not overcome famine, and may help to prolong it,” someone will always lament. Those who spend the time to study the local economies see that the people have now geared their own activities not to returning to their old lives but to getting their hands on aid.(pages 21-22)t… In essence, the West’s surplus grains were subsidizing the production of bananas and other crops that did not compete with Western agricultural interests. And Somalia’s elite were making millions of dollars at both ends of the system. All this was made possible by food aid—and as more farmers were forced off their land, food aid became more necessary. The cycle of food-aid dependence was self-sustaining. tAnd what about the donors? Did they care what their aid was doing? A World Bank study charged that donors were concerned only with their own domestic agricultural situation. “[D]onors’ food aid budgets are primarily influenced by prospects for commercial exports of their food surpluses rather than being determined in accordance with the needs and objectives of recipient countries to reduce their food import dependency. Accordingly, donors usually reduce their food aid budgets when prospects for commercial exports of surpluses are good and increase than when those prospects are poor. As a result, significant price fluctuations are likely to occur in the domestic food market, particularly when the former decision of donors happens to coincide with a poor harvest in the recipient country and the latter with a good one.” (page 170)t…USAID doles out close to 80 percent of its contracts and grants to U.S. firms—which in turn provide food, supplies, or assistance to recipient nations overseas. tOrganizations that lobby on behalf of aid understand that. They know the way to sell aid in Congress is to emphasize what we get from it. Yet these organizations, NGOs mostly, are put in a position to lobby on behalf of multibillion-dollar corporations so they can do their little piece of work and get their relatively tiny slice of the pie. tThe grain-trading companies dominate the world of food, and in this scheme of things, the NGOs and charities serve two very important functions. First, they are the primary lobbyists for sending food to the Third World. … Second, they are the agents, the contractors who move the food. tYet even the NGOs know that they have to pitch food aid for its domestic benefits. Ken Hackett, director of Catholic Relief Services, selling the idea of food aid to Congress said, “Each food aid dollar has at least a double impact. First, the funds are spent primarily in the United States on U.S. commodities, processing, bagging, fortification, and transportation. This enhances economic activity and increases the tax receipts to the U.S. government. Second, the food is provided to people and countries which cannot afford to import adequate amounts of food on a commercial basis. Finally, when PVOs are involved, we leverage funds and services and gain broad public participation. tThe modern role of the NGO developed in the years following the creation of the Food for Peace program, and much of that early activity took place in Vietnam. The U.S. government found PL-480 to be a handy way to get around agreements limiting the amount of aid funds that could be sent to Vietnam. NGOs were under tremendous pressure to cooperate. As Professor Vernon Ruttan noted, “While cooperating with the government, the PVOs voiced their dissatisfaction with the increasing politicization of their programs. IN spite of their reservations they allowed themselves to be used, because they were dependent on government money and supplies; most were willing to do whatever was necessary—including distributing food in situations that were at best questionable and at worst harmful to recipients.”tThat was in the early 1960s, and little has changed. CARE, the largest American NGO, has a budget that approaches half a billion dollars annually. More than half of that is in the form of commodities and funds they receive to administer the distribution of commodities.tAccording to the General Accounting Office in fiscal year 1993, NGOs distributed almost 1.2 million metric tons of U.S.-donated food aid, not including emergency aid, to fifty-eight countries. PVOs sold about 13 percent of the Title II commodities in 1993 to conduct nonfood projects. The GAO has noted that NGOs tend to distribute food first, and examine the consequences later:AID and PVOs have generally evaluated food aid projects based on commodity management and outputs, such as numbers of children fed or miles of road constructed, but have not assessed the impact of their projects on long-term food security. AID has stated that it and the PVOs are fully committed to doing a better job at evaluating the impact of food aid development projects on long-term food security and are making progress in developing and applying methodologies. tHumanitarian organizations have become comfortable in bed with the grain companies. Their survival and growth depend on it, but they must realize how the humanitarian instinct has become perverted by its partnership with domestic special interests. Humanitarians speak eloquently about the need for relief of hunger in the Third World. Yet most of the food aid they hand out—about 90 percent—is not emergency aid for starving people. (In fact, by law at least 76 percent of the commodities provided under Title II must be used for nonemergency development activities.) When food aid is criticized, their response is, “Do you suggest we let people starve?” It seems they’ve learned much from their partners in agribusiness, who see starving people as little more than another market for their products.(pages 201-202)tThe episode reflected a prevalent Western attitude that anything we send, anything we can do, is needed and useful. It is the same attitude that hammers home the message that for the price of a cup of coffee, we can alter the lives of poor children in the Third World. It is bargain-basement charity. (page 264)tHilsum and I were at a conference in Geneva in December of 1995 where someone remarked, “You need a license to drive a taxi in New York City, but anyone can form a charity and start working overseas.” The United States government has passed laws that govern the behavior of U.S. businesses abroad, but there are no such rules for charities. There is no accountability. The UN can attempt to run a refugee camp but has no authority to tell an organization they can’t pitch a tent and start working. There’s nothing to prevent a group of Westerners with money from setting up shop and performing surgery on refugees. No one is going to ask for their medical diplomas or evidence of liability insurance. When I was a Peace Corps volunteer in Kenya, I remember meeting a doctor working in a bush hospital who elatedly told me, “I’d have to wait another five years before they’d let me do the things I’m doing here at home.”tOn top of this, much of what these organizations do, they do with public money. In 1993, American NGOs received more than $1.7 billion from USAID, including $414 million in food commodities and freight. Other federal agencies, such as the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture, handed over an additional $439 million. A decade earlier NGOs received just over $1 billion from the federal government. More than 60 percent of American NGOs receive some kind of federal funding. And this doesn’t include taxpayer monies channeled through UN agencies. tOrganizations like the National Charities Information Bureau do a decent job monitoring expenditures and the proportion of funds NGOs devote to overhead and fund-raising, yet they’re in no position to make any judgments about the work these groups do. By NCIB’s standards, AmeriCares is among the best charities. Because most of what they get are contributions in kind, 100 percent of which they are able to pass along to recipients; AmeriCares is able to make the amazing claim that 99.1 percent of donations go to the needy. No one asks if the needy want those donations or need those donations. Most organizations follow suit and do their best, as Save the Children does, to make that pie chart look good because that’s the only thing critics and watchdogs tend to look at. tJournalists are currently in the best position to judge NGOs, but those who are too critical of the organizations aren’t allowed access to their projects, and NGOs are under no obligation to open their books or reveal their activities to the press. At any rate, few journalists are equipped to do a detailed and accurate analysis of development activities. It takes more time than journalists generally have. You can walk into a village, see happy children and a Save the Children logo on the local school, and judge that everything is fine. Recipients of aid aren’t stupid enough to complain to journalists about projects especially if someone from the NGO is within earshot. tIn a place like Somalia and Rwanda, it was particularly difficult to criticize NGOs. They had all the money and all the airplanes. The only rides to Goma, for journalists who weren’t back by big new organizations with money to charter planes, was with aid organizations. They were more than happy to help. The return on investment makes it all worthwhile because NGOs need nothing more than publicity. Their prime interest is in reaching their customers, the donating public. These are the people who must be convinced that the organizations are doing what they say they’re doing, and NGOs look after their customers at all times.tWhat is really required is a truly independent agency—not one like InterAction, which is composed of NGOs—to look after the interests of the targets of development and relief, a.k.a., the needy. The organization should be staffed by professionals who have the time and resources to produce detailed analyses of what these organizations are doing for the poor of the Third World. Those that do effective aid work should be singled out so “customers” know where to spend their money. IN the short run, that will stop the wildfire proliferation of NGOs, and eventually reduce them to a manageable number so that relief circuses like Rwanda don’t ever happen again.(pages 268-269)
Michael Maren explores how foriegn aid destroys the Somali economy. He interviews a few differnet people from Somalians to aid workers to NGO officials to Somalian officials exploring the different ways that corruption is apparent. He goes into details about the background of the conflict in Somalia but honestly the book is very disjointed and hard to follow in terms of timeline. He also skips around in terms of subjects and what not. I found it quite difficult to follow. The basic premise is extremely interesting, how when there is famine/conflict in a third world country, NGOs flood in to provide "aid", however much of the aid they provide doesn't end up in the hand of refugees but instead of the hands of corrupt politicians who use the aid to help fund their army or whatever they want. They buy up land and then rent it to NGOs often charging exhorbant amounts of money. The food they steal they later sell and keep the profits. The politicians WANT more refugees because they want the aid to keep flowing in so they do their best to keep people there. They don't actually try to develop any sustainable way to improve the lives of the refugees because then the aid would stop. For the NGOs, many of them do not care that their aid is going to the wrong purposes. As long as their numbers look good, they can say they donated x% of the money towards their cause to get more donations. Many times they don't even seem to care whether what they give is even needed. They simply wish to have nice looking pie charts and portfolios to show donors while throwing themselves extravagent parties. Some charities where someone sponsors a child, the child isn't even in need, the money doesn't actually go to the child and the charity simply just takes the money to use for their own purposes. Maren interviews the sponsored children and they barely have anything to show for it. Worse, having all this aid flood into the economy ruins the lives of people who do not get the aid. Farmers cannot compete with the free food that flows in and people who are not refugees become jealous of the people who are refugees who get the immense amount of food. Even with a lot of stealing and corruption some food does end up with the refugees, many of whom sell it because the refugee numbers are so inflated that that much food isn't needed. Anyways, the topic is so incredibly fascinating but the book really jumbles the timeline. At the end they even have a timeline of events which is most definitely needed. But I mean by that time it's way too late, put it in the beginning so I know it's there so I can refer to it. Whats the point of putting it at the end???? I'm not going to reread the book to try to understand it I have more books to read damn you Maren.
Do You like book The Road To Hell (2002)?
I learned that food aid is a tricky business and there is a lot of unnecessary suffering in the aid business due t greed and incompetence...and don't go swimming of the coast of Mogadishu (not a vacation hot spot I know) because some genius put a meat processing plant there, pumped the refuse (chum) into the water...and you can guess the outcome. For some reason, this little bit of incompetence struck me more than the inevitable US incompetence in Somalia due to the Berg's Communist takeover of Ethiopia and the inevitable (we must love a geographically close nutjob response)
—Tony Cohen
The Road to Hell focuses primarily on the disingenuous efforts by Save The Children in Somalia in the early 1990s. While interesting and by no means flattering to Save, it must be understood that much of the information comes from a disillusioned employee. (As a side note I know many people who currently work for Save and am impressed by their skill, commitment, and professionalism. Save itself has greatly reformed since the time covered in this book). The Road to Hell also focuses on the overall negative effects of US food aid and how it cripples foreign markets, destroys efforts at local agriculture, and primarily supports US markets.Overall insightful and worth a read.
—Alden
Michael Maren's book is simply brilliant in its exhaustive research and compassion and perspective. When the book was written in 1997, the author had already spent nineteen years in Africa – in Kenya, Somalia, Burkina faso, Rwanda and Ethiopia – reporting on the famine, civil war and military conflicts in the region. So, he is eminently qualified to take a critical look at international charity organizations and overseas aid projects in Africa and also the United Nations organizations like UNHRC. What emerges is a scathing revelation of foreign aid and international charity as an end in itself and a self-serving system where these organizations care less about the victims of famine and civil war and more about their own organizational interests and the perpetuation of their organizations' interests.Maren investigates extensively the major organizations like CARE, Save the Children and UNHCR in the long civil strife of Somalia and shows how they all treat every famine, civil war and displacement of people as a 'business opportunity' and descend in large numbers to do 'famine relief'. Actually, there is vast money in famine relief and managing small scale conflicts in places like Africa after the end of the Cold war. These NGOs as well as the UN bureaucracy chase these billions of dollars and set up shop in places of strife where the aid workers lead comfortable lives in their protected enclaves, ride around in Landrovers and end up basically destroying the self-sufficient fabric of the societies into which they descend. The other key players in this sorry saga are of course, the local warlords and dictators who have a vested interest in the continuation of the famine and dependency on foreign aid to advance their own clan or sectarian interests. Maren shows how even the military establishments like the Pentagon and NATO get involved in these places like Somalia, Bosnia, Ethiopia etc to test out their 'capabilities' in the post-Cols War scenarios. The author shows how the western media also plays a role in aiding and abetting this nexus of 'NGO-UN-military and local warlords by exaggerating the crisis in target countries like Somalia by beaming the faces of emaciated children and dead cattle and disease and poverty.Maren makes two important observations. One is about the deception of the charity organizations using pie charts to convey an impression that something like 85% of the donor's money being used for 'program services'. Often this term 'program services' tends to be just a play on semantics. Investigations show that only 10% actually goes in the service of ultimate beneficiaries. The other point is about charities destroying the traditional inter-dependence of nomads and settled people in Somalia and Ethiopia. Aid organizations forced nomads to settle down to farming without providing a way for them to survive when drought conditions make farming impossible.Maren shows in 1997 how the crisis in Rwanda had all the facets of new 'business opportunities' for the NGOs just as Somalia was receding from the front pages of the western media. To me, the book was a revelation of how sordid this whole gamut of aid organizations and NGOs which have proliferated in the past decades. In Michael Maren's own words, the point is made as follows:“The NGOs are seeking ever newer tasks to tackle. Where they once spoke of basic human needs, women in development and sustainable development, they now address issues of land mines, conflict avoidance, and now the latest and trendiest of issues - 'civil society'. The same aid workers who once tried (and largely failed) to teach farmers to grow things are now fanning out and sowing the seeds of 'civil society' across the world. Generally speaking, a civil society is one that is held together by rule of law, not one of loyalties to clan. It is the essence of the cultural struggles taking place in Somalia, Bosnia and even New York city. In many ways, it is a constant struggle , and one that seems bizarrely juxtaposed with the traditional notion and capacities of an NGO. Yet it is a growth opportunity. Along with land-mine clearance and conflict avoidance/resolution, it is where the money is. Few NGOs have seen a contract they didn't like or a problem they didn't believe they could solve. The first priority of any NGO, like any bureaucracy, is its own survival.”It is one of the best books I have read in recent years and I strongly recommend it to anyone interested in international charity and foreign aid institutions as well as what happened really in the Somali crisis of the 1980s and 90s.
—Raghu
