In this readable,insightful, and well-written volume, Hastings aims to paint a “portrait” of the war and does not claim to provide anything resembling a comprehensive history, although in the end the book is a fine balance of both for the most part. The book is also mostly focused on military actions.Hastings argues that China’s intervention in the war was, to a large degree, motivated by a sense of patriotism, rather than a reflexive pro-Communist ideology. The Americans had, of course, committed naval forces to Formosa, which the Chinese viewed as a threat to their sovereignty; crucially, they also thought the defeat of US forces in Korea could resolve the Formosa issue. Hastings also argues that the chief aim of the Soviet Union’s Korean policy was to avoid a direct confrontation with the US, and that the Chinese acted unilaterally (more recent research into the issue has largely reached the same conclusion). Although Soviet-North Korean relations cooled as the war ground on, Soviet diplomatic and military support had, in a very real sense, made North Korea’s aggression possible.Despite their initially limited goals, the Chinese soon, like the Americans, adopted “mission creep” and aimed for a decisive victory on the Peninsula, a decision that would cost them dearly in manpower as the war ground on. At the same time, US forces were woefully unprepared for war, as “nearly every unit in the army was under-strength, under-trained, and under-equipped.” Many GIs couldn’t even grasp the basics of handling a rifle, and more than one had been deployed from quiet postings with almost zero training but with their records marked combat-ready. Hastings also gives us a good portrait of MacArthur (whose judgment he calls “fatally unstable”), who felt that, once a shooting war broke out, the military commander in the field should operate unhindered, become the primary decisionmaker, and be granted the widest discretion. This was basically the kind of authority he had exercised during the last war, and it seems that he felt the new age of superpowers, atomic weapons, and limited war was no different. From the beginning, however, the Truman administration was never entirely comfortable with MacArthur in charge. While it doesn’t always seem like MacArthur was any sort of military genius, his achievements in the Pacific theater in the last war were in many ways real. Hastings calls the decision to cross the 38th parallel “a classic example of military opportunity becoming the engine of political desirability...the very great political and diplomatic hazards were submerged by the public perception of the prospect of outright military victory.”“In Korea as in Vietnam,” Hastings writes, “the United States showed itself militarily at a loss about the conduct of a war amid a peasant society. The will simply did not exist, in the United States and far less among her allies, to treat Kim Il Sung’s act of aggression in Korea as a pretext for all-out war against Asian communism. And had it done so, it remains doubtful whether MacArthur’s policy was militarily practicable, even without the support of nuclear weapons. If MacArthur had had his way, the cost to the moral credibility of the United States would almost certainly have been disastrous. Truman’s greatest difficulty was that his own political authority was too weak to explain to his own people the realities of the new world in which they lived, where immense military power could not always be translated into effective foreign influence. Perhaps more than any other conflict in history, the outcome of World War II could be claimed as a simple triumph of good over evil. Yet in 1951, only six years later, such clear-cut decisions already seemed obsolete. Americans were learning to come to terms with a world of constant crises, of problems chronically resistant to solutions. The finest minds in the Administration understood all this. But it was a wholly unwelcome message to convey to Middle America---or to such a man as Douglas MacArthur.”Hastings also does a fine job fleshing out the moral ambiguity of the Korean War, and all sides had plenty of things they couldn’t particularly be proud of. The North Koreans committed plenty of well-documented atrocities, while at the same time the UN forces’ handling of POWs was less than stellar (Koje Island being an obvious example). He also vividly fleshes out the experience of UN POWs, which ranged from humorous to surreal to tragic (he also argues that the notion that the Chinese “brainwashed” many POWs is mostly unfounded, and that Chinese efforts to that end were mostly crude, clumsy, or stupid). Many Americans questioned the aims of the Korean venture, especially when confronted by the hostility or indifference of the Korean locals. And, of course, American GIs returned home after the war to an indifferent public pre-occupied with other things and disillusioned with the failure to achieve a decisive victory.In all, Hastings’ writing is strong and vivid, and he covers the important parts of this story in an efficient manner. Some of Hastings’ arguments will provoke debate or maybe derision; he argues that British forces were in much better shape than the US, that the leadership of the US was often inadequate (mainly MacArthur, although Hastings isn’t the first historian to reach this defensible conclusion) and, of course, that the ceasefire really was a “substitute for victory.” He does not, however, dispute the argument that the war was unjustifiable. Hastings also includes plenty of situations of surreal humor, such as when US troops at the Chosin reservoir are air-dropped “recreation packs” that for some reason include condoms (“What the fuck do they think we are doing with those Chinese?”)Hastings’ book is heavy on analysis (especially regarding the “unpreparedness” part), but the conclusions are often rather vague, with little solid evidence to back them up. Much of his criticism is also focused on the lower ranks, and Hastings often seems to suggest that the higher-ups were unaware of these shortcomings, but this part of the book seemed a little weak. Also, Hastings’ British perspective seems like a minor shortcoming at times; Imjin River gets an entire chapter while other actions by the Americans on a similar scale are given short shrift. And he doesn’t really look at how “unpreparedness” affected British performance. Nor is there much coverage of China’s participation, that of South Korean and North Korean soldiers, or on post-1953 Korea. Also while describing the history of unconventional warfare during the war Hastings writes that “Hans Tofte...set up a new unit named the Office of Policy Coordination to organize covert activity.” This is inaccurate. OPC was set up by NSC in 1948 with State, Defense, and CIA representatives, reported to State, and was eventually merged with the CIA in 1951. Tofte would work with OPC during the Korean War, but he wasn’t the one who set it up. And in a few instances his writing is odd, like saying that in 1949 “relations” between the Koreas “rose sharply.”Overall, a balanced, compelling history with a fluid, gripping, and often surreal narrative.
Max Hastings book, ‘The Korean War’ is a book that surveys the Cold War conflict between the start of the Korean War on June 25th 1950 to the signing of the armistice on July 27th 1953 and to some of the after effects of the war years after. On the only stage where Cold War adversaries ever faced off each other directly in military conflict, I was quickly surprised at how much the text almost read like a study in contemporary issues. It seems that the mistakes, both tactical and political, not only repeated themselves during the Vietnam conflict, but have recently been re-inserted in the present conflict over in Iraq. Some of the biggest mistakes not only between military and political factions help to create a no win situation for America and in general, the U.N., but a lack of understanding (I was surprised that during the interviews the author had with veterans of the Korean War, the use of the derogatory and racist word "gooks" was still being employed 37 years later as it was during the conflict [the original publication of this work was in 1987:]). This springs to mind the reports of the casualness of President Bush's ignorance and indifference to the two major factions of Islam in Iraq, the Sunni and the Shi'a. In the case of the Korean War, there seems to be no attempt to understand the land of Korea, it's culture, or its history that would have enabled the U.S. to have greater success in bringing more unity of goals between the people of Korea and the U.S./U.N. Another interesting point brought by the author is that of America's tendency to support a charismatic leader rather than a whole movement, which might have strengthened South Korea's democracy a lot sooner. It was apparent even by the United States in the dying days of the war that by supporting Syngman Rhee that it was backing the wrong horse. The sacking of Douglas MacArthur (sacking is as strong a word possible here) was a drama that was in itself riveting reading. A hero of World War Two in idealist battle with Truman is not only fascinating reading, but troublesome as well. To think that brinkmanship may have caused a sort of Cuban missile crisis twelve years sooner is a frightening, yet even possible reality, as Hastings does not give the reader assurances that it was a sure thing that atomic weapons use was not off the table, and documents the difference in attitude between British and American (civilian, military, and political)policy on the use of such weapons. There are only two criticisms of this book. One is that Hastings causes confusion about the true role of Russia in the conflict, until very near the end, when the reader is told that the Russians did provide aid, as a positive loan which was costly and caused resentment by the Chinese and which was causing a conflict as potentially dangerous to the two professed Stalinist regimes as it was between America and North Korea/China. The other point is his conclusion, which he states was a defeat to America. Though he points out that there are others who see as keeping safe South Korea from Communist domination, he seems to fall on the failure hypothesis. For this reader, the evidence he supports shows more as a draw, with both sides winning a piece of the pie. This is in spite of the opinions between American military and politicians. I find it hard pressed to not see the "glass half full" argument being employed here, or at least to suggest that there might, in the end and at the time of it's publication, 37 years after the fact, some ambiguity as to the success and/or failure of such an undertaking. All in all, this is quite a good start for someone not acquainted with this period of American/Korean/Chinese history.
Do You like book The Korean War (2000)?
This is an excellent history of the war. Hastings does a wonderful job of covering details from the highest level of political negotiations down through individual experiences of combat. It gave me a new appreciation for what the war was all about, and it gave me a good understanding of why we fought the way we did. There were some aspects of the war, particularly about how the U.S. handled Chinese and North Korean prisoners, that I had been unaware of.One of the quotes that gave me a lasting impression was something to the effect that we went into Korea with a poor Army and came out with a pretty good one. We went into Viet Nam with a good army and came out with a bad one. It still puzzles me that we did not learn the lessons of Korea and apply them in Viet Nam, but perhaps that is another history.I am definitely going to look for more histories by Max Hastings.
—Richard Palmer
Sir Max Hastings has written a very detailed narrative on the War in Korea. He has also provided readers with an excellent and concise coverage of the Korean war in its entirety. From the constant political debates ensuing from Washington, London and the UN, to the daily struggles of the life of a grunt in the front lines fighting and clinching on to his dear life. Everything is laid out in a way that is easily readable. This book also includes testimonies not only from the UN troops who fought in the war but also that of their opponents; Chinese troops who saw the value life differently from their Capitalist counterpart. The various interviews of enemy troops give readers a unique perspective of the emotions and thoughts of the enemy during the war.However, the one aspect I was rather taken aback of while reading was the excessive glorification of the British Government and military during the war and the constant bashing of the Americans. This narrative was written in a way that the British were heroes while the Americans did a really bad job during the war. Sure, the Americans bore the most brunt of blame for the mistakes that occurred during the war, but by no means are the British immaculate. There was almost nothing negative written about the British in this book. "The British Marines retreated honorably unlike their American counterparts", " The British Marines shaved everyday unlike the ill-disciplined Americans who liked keeping a stubble". Yes, we get it, The British are honorable people, but I think it was of no coincidence that all the interviews that were gained from the British were mostly painting Americans in a bad light. Surely, the British had to bore some of the blame that stemmed from the "Forgotten war". Take this instance, British chaplain Padre Sam Davies is being spoken of highly in the book for his heroics during the battlefield and courage while under captivity. But Father Emil Kapuan, probably the greatest and most prominent chaplain in the history of warfare was only mentioned in a measly sentence.By no means am I disputing the factual contents of the book, but the glorification of the British in this book made me wonder if this narrative could be written in a more objective and neutral tone. It is kind of disappointing for someone who wanted a neutral read on the war in Korea.Sometimes, it becomes very frustrating and painful to read.
—Leonard Leow
Well, I'm considerably better-educated about this war - which I'd hitherto only heard of from MASH - than I was when I started. You come away with an abiding sense of opportunities missed and terrible cock-ups on both sides. Bottom line is though, you only have to look at S Korea vs N Korea today to think that it was a good thing for the S Koreans that the war was fought. And if only the UN had found some way to win that war, perhaps the poor N Koreans wouldn't still be stuck in their awful grim hell.Also discovered a hero in General Matthew Ridgway - again, whom I'd never heard of - who made me think, not for the first time, what an appalling leader I'd make, when you see what an inspirational one looks like.
—Fazackerly Toast
