About book The History Of The Peloponnesian War (1954)
Thucydides sounds surprisingly modern for a writer who lived 2,400 years ago. He provides a record of over 21 years in strict chronological order and describes the interests of the two sides with more objective fairness than can be expected today from modern journalists (especially the TV kind). He mentions in the middle of the book that he spent 20 years away from Athens in exile, so that may explain why he can describe the non-Athenian view with such poignancy."I lived through the whole of it, being of an age to comprehend events, and giving my attention to them in order to know the exact truth about them. It was also my fate to be an exile from my country for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis, and being present with both parties, and more especially with the Peloponnesians by reason of my exile, I had leisure to observe affairs more closely."This book deserves honor and respect due to its antiquity, and the fact it has survived all those years. It was written about 400 BCE and the oldest surviving manuscript dates from 900 CE. That is 1300 years over which the equivalent of a 700 paged book needed to be hand copied at approximately 100 year intervals in order for it to still be available today.In addition to his strict adherence to chronology, Thucydides also includes dozens of speeches assigned to the principal figures engaged in the war. These include addresses given to troops by their generals before battles and numerous political speeches, both by Athenian and Spartan leaders, as well as debates between various parties. Of the speeches, the most famous is the funeral oration of Pericles. Thucydides undoubtedly heard some of these speeches himself while for others he relied on eyewitness accounts. Some of the speeches are probably fabricated according to his expectations of, as he puts it, "what was called for in each situation." While the inclusion of long first-person speeches is somewhat alien to modern ears it makes sense within the context of ancient Greek oral culture.The gods play no active role in Thucydides' work--very different from Herodotus. Instead, Thucydides regards history as being caused by the choices and actions of human beings. When referencing myth he clearly so indicates:”The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any part of the country are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot tell of what race they were, or from where they came or to where they went, and must leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and to what may be generally known concerning them.”Thucydides correlates, in his description of the 426 BC Maliakos Gulf tsunami, for the first time in the history of natural science, quakes and waves in terms of cause and effect:“The cause, in my opinion, of this phenomenon must be sought in the earthquake. At the point where its shock has been the most violent the sea is driven back, and suddenly recoiling with redoubled force, causes the inundation. Without an earthquake I do not see how such an accident could happen.”Another interesting reference to natural phenomena is his description of the volcanic action of Mt. Etna:”In the first days of this spring, the stream of fire issued from Etna, as on former occasions, and destroyed some land of the Catanians, who live upon Mount Etna, which is the largest mountain in Sicily. Fifty years, it is said, had elapsed since the last eruption, there having been three in all since the Hellenes have inhabited Sicily.”Another interesting quotation I found contains a hint of Thucydides' skepticism of divination and soothsayers:"... they gave orders as secretly as possible for all to be prepared to sail out from the camp at a given signal. All was at last ready, and they were on the point of sailing away when an eclipse of the moon, which was then at the full, took place. Most of the Athenians, deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged the generals to wait; and Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted to divination and practices of that kind, refused from that moment even to take the question of departure into consideration, until they had waited the thrice nine days prescribed by the soothsayers."As it turns out, the 27 day delay caused by the lunar eclipse probably resulted in the Athenians losing the battle, and consequently the war as well.Despite being an Athenian and a participant in the conflict, Thucydides is often regarded as having written a generally unbiased account of the conflict and all the sides involved in it. In the introduction to the piece he states, "My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last forever." Some historians have challenged this assertion, but it appeared true to me.The book has an unsatisfactory ending. It suddenly ends in the 21st year of the 27 year long war. Historians are not certain as to why it ends there. One possibility is that he died. But there are some sources that suggest that he lived beyond the end of the war. He mentions in his own text that the war lasted 27 years. So answer me this! If he died before the end of the war, how did he know the length of time for the duration of the war? Maybe his pet dog ate the last 6 years. Or maybe he did things as I do, just never got around to finishing the job.I find it interesting to note what is not in the book. There is no mention of the two individuals who subsequently became the most famous Ancient Greek names of the era, Socrates and Plato. (There is one reference to "Socrates son of Antigenes," but that it is not the Socrates we know about from Plato.) Socrates and Plato were contemporaries of Thucydides, but they were mere civilians of little consequence--although Socrates did fight in the early parts of the war as a young man. The importance of Socrates and Plato only became evident with the later popularity of Plato's writing. It's interesting to note that writers of contemporary history don't always know what will be considered important to later readers--e.g. Josephus' making no mention of Jesus and writing one sentence about his followers.The only reason I listened to this book was because it was selected for discussion by the Great Books KC group. I listened to the LibriVox audio recording of the translation by Richard Crawley. Otherwise I would have never had the patience for it. A much more pleasant way to learn about the Peloponnesian War is the historical novel, Tides of War by Steven Pressfield. Link to my Review.
“Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” I’ll give my readers the same warning Thucydides does: this text is not for the faint hearted. It is not funny, or romantic, or even exciting (odd given how it’s a war story). It took me a year to read because of its difficulty and tedium. It’s the epitome of an ancient, arcane tome no one in our society has time for. Outside of military academies it is never taught in any school, or chosen for any book club. So we then ask: why would anyone read it? The answer is because it’s the single greatest historical work in existence; a “possession for all time.”The History of the Peloponnesian War is a first-person account of the Peloponnesian war, during the fifth century BCE. This conflict was during classical Greece’s golden age where the two main city-states, Athens and Sparta, fought for supremacy. It consumed the entire country and ended in nothing less than devastation for all involved. In order to understand Thucydides' success we must examine his style and themes. To begin with, the work’s difficulty actually works in his favor. With any work of art we’re conscious of its apparatus, even while we become immersed. We always know it’s not real; the author conjured this world for our sake. The History is so bland that the story actually rises above the text, and we begin to appreciate what actually happened and forget it is an artistic retelling. This lends a power and emotion to the story normal fiction has a hard time replicating. It’s almost like the world’s first documentary. But we shouldn’t be fooled—many feel history is just a fiction with multiple authors—so let’s take a closer look.Thucydides was a general during the war, and knew he could provide valuable insight on the conflict. He also felt the conflict was significant enough that future generations could learn from it. He was right. But the only other great historian of his time, Herodotus, had a unique style to his History of the Greco-Persian Wars that would not serve Thucydides purpose. The former was lax and gullible, the latter austere and critical. H was more interested in culture, geography, myth, and fate. T is more military, economic, political, and scientific. H saw in history a thread of divine purpose and sought to find it. T saw only chaos, and pulled from that chaos his own moral. As you no doubt can tell, T is much more attuned to the contemporary mind. Thus the text before us is surprisingly modern. History of the Peloponnesian War examines people’s motives and actions within certain restrictions and attempting specific goals. It is the world’s first and greatest advocate of political realism.Thucydides is also a big fan of the dialectic method. He understood there are two sides to every issue, and verbal debate often coincides with battle. And while the text is unmoral he’s not afraid to break the narrative and insert his own insights, which make up some of the strongest parts of the whole. It’s true he exaggerates some of the speeches, but it’s silly to think they’re complete fabrication. Oral memory was very strong in early history, and his audience would have called him out had he lied or strayed too far. His sources are always first or second-hand, and he obviously understood his subject matter. The text successfully comes off as objective and fair. These observations culminate to make him a great historian, and his work a great history, but why am I claiming him to be the best?Our view of classical Greece is probably more important than what actually happened. No one can ever really know, and if they did it would be distorted by their bias. But our understanding of a critical time in history—when the glory of Greece ended in maddening suicide—is woven together by this unwelcoming text. It’s imperative we internalize its message. And what is the message?In short, after the Greco-Persian wars Athens attained a level of wealth, confidence, and power most only dream of. Under the guidance of a great man, Pericles, these virtues were channeled into art and science. The golden age of Greece is really the achievement of Athens during this time. In the greatest speech of the text, Pericles celebrates both Athens and democracy. But this pride lead to a fatal assumption: surely other parts of the world would like to be led by our splendor? Surely we deserve to rule others with our magnificence? Thus Athens became an imperial power. Much of Greece saw what was happening and rallied under Sparta to oppose her. Over thirty odd years Athens degraded into political turmoil and ethical savagery. They committed harrowing atrocities and eventually wasted all of their wealth on senseless campaigns. Finally Sparta allied with Persia and ended the war. Athens, and the rest of Greece, would never rise again.From a petty battle between insignificant city states Thucydides saw a profound lesson for history. What was perhaps the most hopeful civilization of all time killed itself through pride and greed. It is a lesson for all countries, and especially the United States. He realized idealism is mostly words, and words are mostly meaningless. For people simply act in their own interests and power is what rules. This is a bitter pill for most to swallow, and has become well-accepted nowadays. But where someone like Machiavelli or contemporary scholars may postulate these claims, they are never as effective as seeing them in action. And History is the perfect text to do so; it’s just a shame no one ever reads it.
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For all points and purposes I will clarify now that though I read most of this book this review will center on "The Melian Dialogue". I am going to post the paper that I wrote for class on this particular part of the war because I think it though playing a small part summed up major part of this conflict as a whole: The Melian Dialogue by Thucydides – Reaction Essay “Melians: But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood ensures our fidelity.” International relations are a very tricky thing. The failed negotiations over and subsequent conquest of the Melians by the Athenians have become a milestone of international relations during war time. You have the Melians, who have been in a state of official neutrality and whose size is much smaller than Athens and the Delian League, being pretty adamant that their traditional allies the Spartans would help them. The actual dialogue is very interesting as it tells us a lot of, I feel, awkward and shocking details about international prestige that are still true today. I was impressed at the seeming impartiality of Thucydides account of the negotiation. It was noted early on in the chapter (section 84) that the neutrality was maintained until the Athenians themselves took to plundering that the Melians became openly hostile. That might suggest that if Athens had not have done such things the Melians may have token a more favorable attitude in submitting to the Delian League. Of Course we get to the “dialogue” proper and see that independence is something that is worth just a little more to the Melians than to the other Spartan colonies/allies. The Athenian diplomats on their part realize when they are not brought before the public proper but are taken to just the leaders of the colony realize that rhetorical flourish will not cut it and get down to business, making it plain that “we will receive you on good terms and you will be a loyal colony of Athens” to paraphrase. The Melians aren’t keen on this but offer a compromise to join Athens as equals. The Athenian diplomats aren’t having that and now take great pains to remind the Melian leaders that Athens is much bigger and much more powerful and any hold-out against it would be folly. The Melians make the offer again, and now the Athenians become even more direct and frank and what they say sends a chill up my spine because it makes me wonder how many big countries still think like this (hint, hint), [97]“they think...that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea.” This admission may be one of the most shocking, damning, and probably, common excuse for military aggression ever used. The Melians also bring up their confidence in the gods’ favor and more importantly the fervent help of the Spartans. The Athenian diplomats say that they themselves are confident in who the gods support (Athens would ultimately lose the war to Sparta, keep note) and remarked that the Spartans while good warriors when their own interest are at stake are much more pragmatic when others need help. This is also something that has not changed in the international community (hello Syrian conflict). In the end the Athenians fail miserably to convince the Melians to peacefully submit and in a year’s time as Thucydides himself remarks, “the Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves.”
—Ken Moten
This is one of the early classic "histories" written. Of course, Herodotus had written his "History" before. But his acceptance of the role of gods in history renders Thucydides' hard-headed accounts of the Greek internecine warfare a further advance in historiography. Thus, we begin to experience something like a real history in this volume (and that does not denigrate the real contributions of Herodotus). This is a nice volume. The Introduction by M. I. Finley sets the stage; the translation by Rex Warner is (as far as I can tell) serviceable. The work of Thucydides comes through in this collaboration. Thucydides' focus is on the origins of this bloody inter-Greek war. The forces of Athens (and her allies) against Sparta (and her allies) is the center of this work. He notes the cause (page 49): "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." This is, as noted earlier, a fairly hard-headed view of history. To use contemporary terms, the author was something like a "realist." Some major parts of the work. . . . One of these is the funeral oration by Pericles, the Athenian leader. He spoke of what made Athens special. His death, according to Thucydides, was harmful to the Athenian cause. He says (page 163): "For Pericles had said that Athens would be victorious if she bided her time and took care of the navy, if she avoided trying to add to the empire during the course of the war, and if she did nothing to risk the safety of the city itself. But his successors did the exact opposite. . . ." This work has much of interest in it. Just one example. The Melian dialogue featured a debate between the Melians and Athenians. The Melians argued that morality was on their side. The Athenians acknowledged the argument, but also noted that they had the numbers and the weapons. This is an early debate between two schools of thought in international relations--idealists versus realists. The hard-nosed attitude of the Athenians won out in this case. . . . In some ways, Thucydides is best understood by reading Herodotus and then comparing the two, so that one can get a sense of one of the first historians and then someone who adopts a different posture as historian. This is a very good version of Thucydides (from someone who cannot read Greek, by the way). Well worth looking at if a person is interested in the devastating Peloponnesian War.
—Steven Peterson
The Peloponnesian War was, to say the least, a challenging read for me. Thucydides is writing about a war that happened thousands of years ago, in a completely different culture, in an area where I don't know the geography, between a bunch of states that no longer exist. Oh yes, and there is no unified dating system at the time either. It’s also clear from reading the Peloponnesian War that Thucydides was an aspiring general, not an aspiring poet. One review I encountered while searching for a different translation stated that Thucydides “uses a style that might lead a reader to think that he deliberately was putting his readers through some kind of torture.” Well, torture might be putting too fine a word on it, but Thucydides sure doesn’t pamper his readers. He throws a barrage of names, places and generals at you, assuming that his readers are going to know where, what and who he is talking about. If you aren’t a classics scholar, you might not know, for instance, that the Lacedaemonians that Thucydides goes on and on about are just another name for the Spartans. He also jumps around from place to place so he can cover everything chronologically, and this makes following the locations of all the battles and generals tricky. I recommend that anyone who tries reading Thucydides to get a good critical edition with lots of footnotes, maps and as readable a translation as you can find. Blanco was who I wound up with, but there might be better versions out there. Having not read Herodotus, I can’t properly say just how much of the historical discipline Thucydides invented. But I have read Homer, and I do think there’s an interesting comparison to be made there. Thucydides, after all, never mentions Herodotus directly, but he talks about Homer’s facts and figures at length. I think in many ways, Thucydides saw himself as embodying a factual, realistic vision of history in contrast to Homer (and presumably Herodotus, who wrote accounts of history down where the Gods showed up in battle). Homer was very poetic when he wrote that Helen’s was the “face that launched a thousand ships”, but Thycudides notes that for one Agamemnon being the leader of the alliance probably had more to do with it, and for two the number one thousand seems dreadfully inflated.In Homer, war is treated as kind of a crapshoot that comes down to emotional intensity, the favor of the Gods, and the justice of the cause. Greece is destined to win the Trojan War because the stealing of Helen was a violation of hospitality, so the majority of Gods decree it to be so. Achilles fights up to the walls of Troy because he’s super angry, not because he came up with some clever stratagem. Ajax might be kicking butt, but if suddenly Zeus comes down and says “Nope, not today” the Trojans are going to win. In Homer, it’s the favor of the Gods that makes all the difference. The course of events is determined by the gods. And in a fine tradition leading to the present day, people continue to feel that right makes might.Thucydides was probably the first to react to the notion that the side that was more just would be favored by the Gods and win. It’s pretty astonishing in that context to read the debate between Athens and the island of Melos which Athens plans to conquer. Melos complains that the invasion of Athens is unjust and that the gods will punish the Athenians. Athens responds “Yeah, it’s unjust. So what? Who cares about justice? The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. Oh and by the way, the gods aren’t going to fly down and help you guys.” And then Athens steamrolls the colony, kills off all the men and sells the women into slavery. Every decision is made as part of a rational calculus of interests. This rational, realist approach is also reflected in how Thucydides describes battle. For him, it’s not primarily about the emotions of the combatants and the will of the Gods. It’s all about reason and strategy- who has the high ground, who outflanks who, who has retrofitted their ships to better fight in a harbor. The question of whether or not Thucydides actually is the 100% factual rational historian he presents himself as really only occurred to me near the end of the text. Were the Athenians really so cynically frank about their motives? After all, even the most bellicose dictators today at least come up with some meager justification for their actions, why not Athens? Why is it that Thycudides didn’t cite his sources when apparently Herodotus did? Are those long speeches actually verbatim (or near it) as Thycudides claims, or was Thycudides taking a bit of poetic license himself by amalgamating different thoughts, speeches and points that were made over the course of a debate? And though decisions are often made based on reason, its not like people are emotionless robots- some emotion and irrational behavior sneaks in there too.I admit that I found Thucydides tough going, and honestly, I don’t know if I learned a ton about the Peloponnesian War, but I wouldn’t say it was completely a waste of time. Reading it inspired a lot of thought, and showed me a bit about where some of our frames and ideas in political thought and history came from. Just don't expect any poetry.
—Karl H.
