About book Intelligence In War: Knowledge Of The Enemy From Napoleon To Al-Qaeda (2003)
Of all of the clichés of the information age, “knowledge is power” might be one of the biggest and most prevalent. Living in a world where we have daily access to more information than we can possibly process or comprehend, we’ve become conditioned to think that knowing more is in of itself a means of being able to do more. This particular cliché extends to most people’s vision of military operations, where it is assumed that “intelligence”, which is the collection of information about enemy plans and movements, is somehow key in defeating an enemy. More knowledge and more intelligence, we believe, equal a greater chance of victory.In Intelligence in War, John Keegan sets out to challenge that particular belief; he does so through a series of case studies throughout history, beginning with Admiral Nelson’s pursuit of Napoleon in the Mediterranean Sea, and continuing up into the second world war, where he looks at the Battle of Midway, and the Battle of the Atlantic, specifically at the submarine warfare conducted there. After working through his case studies, Keegan works through a summary overview of intelligence operations between the Second World War and the present day, before wrapping things up with an overview of his original thesis, and working towards his own conclusions.For the most part, I enjoyed this one; Keegan writes history well, and has a gift for being able to deliver an historical narrative in an engaging and thoughtful way, without either becoming so mired in the details that he bores, or being so superficial as to miss the point. In a few of the chapters, particular the ones on Stonewall Jackson and Midway, I felt as though he was sometimes rambling a bit from the topic of intelligence in favor of a more narrative story of the battle(s) in question, but overall, it was a rather readable book. I found Face of Battle a bit more engaging, but this one was still interesting.Looking at the Amazon page, I can see that this book generated a fair amount of flack and criticism, which isn’t really surprising to me. Keegan’s assertion that intelligence is less important than other factors in warfare doubtless ruffles some feathers, particular among those in or connected to the intelligence community. For my own part, I think Keegan’s point is at least somewhat valid when he says that “Decision in war is always the result of a fight, and in combat willpower always counts for more than foreknowledge.” While intelligence clearly has its own value leading up to an engagement, at the end of the day, it’s the actual fight that determines the result of a military engagement, not the knowledge. Of course, the knowledge can help, but alone, it isn’t enough. I have the impression that several of Keegan’s critics are taking Keegan’s arguments to mean that he believes intelligence ahs little, if any value, which I think is misinterpreting him a bit—he seems to be speaking primarily about the actual military engagements, and not the overall course of warfare and the effects of intelligence upon it.In any case, for people interested in military history, and the role intelligence operations plays in that history, this book is certainly worth a look.
This book has a lot to recommend it. It is a series of case studies focusing on the usefulness of intelligence in specific battles. Keegan's thesis rejects the normal understanding of intelligence, that "knowledge is power." Instead, Keegan convincingly suggests that intelligence is usually peripheral to determining the outcome of a battle. Power, and the willingness to exercise it through brute, physical force, is the most important point to determining the outcome of a battle. He proves this by looking at specific battles, largely focused on World War II, the Battle of Crete, the Battle of Midway and the Battle of the Atlantic. Tacked onto these are Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign and Nelson's search for Napoleon's fleet. In each of these, he shows the role that intelligence played in the battle. In the Battle of Crete, though the British forces had perfect intelligence, they still were defeated by the German force's brute force. Another point that he implies is that intelligence did not really exist in the form that we think of it today until fairly recently. This largely comes down to communication technology. Before radio, it was difficult to get enough useful intelligence to intelligence consumers to be effective. Stonewall was able to use his knowledge of the Shenandoah Valley, particularly that gathered through his cartographer, but this is not really the work of the modern spy. His cursory review of intelligence from before Napoleon demonstrates how unimportant it was. I have two criticisms of this work. The minor one is that, it is hard to follow some of the battle sequences, particularly as I was listening to it on an audiobook. The Stonewall and Nelson chapters are particularly hard to grasp without a map. The larger criticism of Keegan's work is his belief that anyone who is not white is far too incomprehensible for the Western mind to comprehend. When talking about the Japanese, he occassionally slips into an Orientalism that seems like something pulled from a book in 1903, not 2003. On one occassion, in his analysis of the Japanese, he says they slip into the traditional complexity of the Oriental mind. Obviously this is wrong and a failure to try to understand the Japanese, but it also makes for a slipshod analysis. This orientalism bleeds into his analysis of Al Qaeda. He complains that these groups are ununderstandable to the Western mind, something that is clearly misguided. The final section on Al Qaeda seems like it was shoehorned in to make the book seem relevant after he had already been writing the book for years. The book would be stronger if Keegan had jettisoned the analysis of groups he decides he cannot understand rather than whining about how incomprehensible they are.
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4-5 stars. On the whole: a very smooth read and often riveting. Where I felt it fell short was (1) in some of Keegan's conclusions and (2) - in more modern examples - places where the author's own political views emerged more than I like in a historical/intelligence analysis. I definitely would have rated the final few chapters 3 stars (if that), which contrasted extremely to the preceding text. Nevertheless, it was without a doubt one of the best-written non-fiction books I've read. The sections on ancient and Napoleonic intelligence were especially well-written and insightful. Furthermore, I was surprised by, and greatly enjoyed, the focus on maritime intelligence.
—J.
John Keegan is probably one of the best military historians to ever put pen to paper, but Intelligence in War is not his best book. It's not as fluidly written or as rational as Keegan's other work. On the basis of intelligence alone, the book is strong but not nearly as informative as other books on the topic. Keegan focuses on intelligence during wartime, and while this study is solid, it is frankly not as fascinating as the operations of various national intelligence services during times of supposed "peace". The book is a good history of how intelligence during war can decide the outcome of a battle, and it is a good overview of the use of intelligence through human history. But for people interested in the specifics of modern intelligence and particularly its use in the West, this may not be the best book to start with.NC
—Nathan
An interesting set of case studies on the impact of intelligence in wartime. The book covers a wide variety of battles with centuries worth of examples. While looking at each instance the author examines and shares in layman's terms both the types of intelligence used and the value of both the intelligence and the use of it. He cites some examples where intelligence was limited and ignored to the detriment of the outcome, and others where it was used to the advantage of the owner.Due to several factors, WWII is covered in most detail. One factor is its proximity in time and documentation of intelligence efforts. Another is the development of several types of intelligence and the multiple theaters in which it was used. Finally, the changing dynamics in WWII intelligence makes the illustrations very informative.Well-written, with an even-handed approach to the value of intelligence, it is a book worth reading.
—Larry Hostetler
